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REVIEW ESSAY: FEMINISM, 
LAWYERING, AND DEATH ROW 
JOAN W. HOWARTH* 
CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR. By BEVERLY LoWRY. 
NEW YORK: ALFRED A. KNOPF, 1992. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Representing men on death row is confounding, but not without 
reward. This lawyering work has taught me at least two lessons, which 
are the subjects of this essay. First, capital punishment-our attempt to 
use legal procedures to kill people fairly-is a feminist issue, or should 
be. Second, death row representation is too big a job for lawyers; we 
need to recruit poets. To develop these ideas, and perhaps to convince 
you without requiring you to undertake the same path to these conclu-
sions, I am appropriating novelist Beverly Lowry's stunning new book, 
Crossed Over: A Murder, A Memoir. 1 Crossed Over is the story of 
Lowry's friendship with Karla Faye Tucker, a woman on death row in 
Texas.2 Lowry is the poet on Tucker's team. The publisher instructs 
booksellers to place Crossed Over on the "Memoir" or "True Crime'~ 
shelf. If shelves were built for "Insights into Death Row Representa-
tion," or even "Illustrations of Relational Feminism," Crossed Over 
would belong there as well. 
• Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. 
I currently represent two men in their appeals of death judgments. My ideas about feminism 
and the death penalty have been strengthened through conversations with many people, especially 
Pat Clark, Kendall Goh, Martha Kegel, and Barry Williams. Leslie DiMario, Eric Ferraro, and 
Asha Khosla provided excellent research assistance. Beverly Lowry presented portions of CROSSED 
OVER at "Feminist Practice: Representation in Law and Literature," the Orgain Lectureship at the 
University of Texas School of Law, March 2, 1991, which I attended by means of generous support 
for faculty development from Golden Gate University. I am especially grateful to Isabelle Gunning, 
Susan Rutberg, and Carol Sanger for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
1. BEVERLY LoWRY, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR (1992). 
2. See Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523 (rex. Crim. App. 1988), cerL denied, 492 U.S. 912 
(1989). 
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II. KARLA FAYE TUCKER AND BEVERLY LOWRY 
My focus on a book about a woman on death row is a bit of a trick 
to catch your attention. The apparent contradiction in my claim that the 
death penalty deserves feminist attention is that we execute men, but 
very few women.3 In fact, executions of women are becoming more and 
more rare.4 
This gets trickier. The reason Karla Faye Tucker is on death row is 
not that she killed, but that she killed like a man. In fact, that is how 
most women on death row make their way there. S Is this the sameness/ 
difference debate' in an evil setting?6 What can a feminist say about a 
3. For example, of the 2636 people on death row in the fall of 1992, 41 (or 1.56%) are 
women. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FuND, INc., DEATH Row, U.S.A. (Fall 
1992). Of the 184 people executed since January 1, 1973, only one (Velma Barfield, executed by 
North Carolina on November 2, 1984) has been a woman. Id. or the 341 people on California's 
death row, three are women. Id. See also Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and 
the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 501, 504-05 (1990) ("One in eight persons arrested 
for murder is a woman, but only one death row inmate in a hundred is a woman. Male murderers 
are twenty times more likely to be death sentenced than female murderers.") (citations omitted) 
[hereinafter Rapaport, Some Questions]; Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Dis-
crimination, 25 LAW & SOC'y REv. 367 (1991) (arguing that though there are few women on death 
row, the numbers are "commensurate with the infrequency of female commission" of capital punish-
ment crimes) [hereinafter Rapaport, Death Penalty]; Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female 
Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 845 (1990) (presenting exhaustive historical and current data on 
women who have been senten~ to die). 
Our constraints against executing women are informal and largely unspoken. By contrast, 
India's laws explicitly provide that a woman's gender weighs against her being executed, and a 
proposed 1988 amendment to the Soviet Union death penalty law would have codified a prohibition 
of the death penalty for female offenders. Id. at 880 & n.l05. 
4. Professor Streib notes that: 
The practice [of executing] women grew steadily with the increase in population, from 
forty-six executions in the seventeenth century to 110 executions in the eighteenth century 
to 198 executions in the nineteenth century. The startling fact is that this practice plum-
meted to only thirty-nine cases thus far in the twentieth century. 
Streib, supra note 3, at 855. In another article, Professor Streib concludes that "[t]he death penalty 
for female offenders has always been rare and is becoming rarer." Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for 
Battered Women, 20 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 163, 184 (1992). 
5. While some of the, recently sentenced females committed their crimes with accom-
plices, the females typically were proven to be the dominant actor in the group. • •• Their 
crimes tended to be horribly violent felony-murders. Indeed, their crimes and behavior 
could be characterized as more like those of male killers than female killers ..•• 
Streib, supra note 3, at 879. See Rapaport, Some Questions, supra note 3, at 513 (stating that, 
"women who commit high severity offenses are treated more harshly than similarly situated men: 
they are punished for violating sex role expectations in addition to being punished for their crimes"). 
6. The core debate amongst feminists about the extent to which women are the same as, or 
different from, men rarely includes discussion on the capacity of women to achieve "male" brutality. 
See generally CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY (1973); THEO-
RETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) [hereinafter THEO-
RETICAL PERSPECTIVES]; Lori S. Kornblum, Women Warriors in a Men's World: The Combat 
Exclusion, 2 LAW & INEQ. 351 (1984) (all focusing on women's capacity for "male" strengths); Sara 
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young woman who fantasized-"dreamed" is too innocent-about 
becoming the first female hit man in the Mafia? 
As told by Beverly Lowry, Karla Faye Tucker'S story is about these 
"tough-guy" dreams of a white Texas girF As a child, Karla8 dreamt of 
being the first female quarterback in the NFL. . She could fight with her 
fists. She started taking drugs at age eight. Her first injection of heroin 
was offered by her older sister's boyfriend, who imagined that sex with 
ten-year-old Karla would be his reward for shooting her Up.9 
Karla's world was an outlaw biker world of drugs, rock and roll, 
and sex. Like her mother, Karla got what she wanted-money, indepen-
dence, drugs-from selling sex. Her men were real men-men who 
drove Harleys. Lowry describes Karla as a "badass enforcer who lived 
by the tough-guy code and saw to it nobody, but nobody, harmed the 
people she loved." 10 
Karla met the love of her life, Danny, "in the waiting room of their 
prescription doctor, who for twenty dollars and a feel would write you 
any prescription you wanted."ll Danny promised Karla he could train 
her to be the first woman hit man in the Mafia. Lowry describes how 
Danny trained Karla: "Teaching her until she made the switch. Became 
no longer prey. Became predator."12 
Together, Danny and Karla committed an excruciatingly brutal 
dou~le murder. Using a pickax and a hammer, they killed an acquain-
tance who had wronged them and the woman who happened to be 
Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINISf STUDIES 342 (1980); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the 
Feminine Voice in Constitutiona! Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) (both discussing the exist-
ence and value, if any, of female virtue). . 
7. Given the prevalence of people of color on death row and the centrality of issues of race to 
any understanding of capital punishment, an essay by a white law professor reviewing a book by a 
white author about her friendship with a whjte woman on death row is a bit of a trick as well. See 
All Condemned Prisoners Don't Get Same Help, ATLANTA J. & CoNSf., May 18, 1992, at A3 (dis-
cussing concern that media paid attention to death row prisoner Roger Coleman because he was 
white and articulate); Tony Mauro, 'Time is Running' Out: ,Many Troubled By Ultimate Penalty, 
USA TODAY, May 20, 1992, at 1 (suggesting that Roger Coleman received such media attention as a 
TIME cover story in part because he was white). For an Afrocentric study of a Black man's execu-
tion, see WILLIAM M. KING, GOING TO MEET A MAN: DENVER'S LAST LEGAL PUBLIC EXECU-
TION, 27 JULY 1886 (1990). 
8. I use "Karla" and "Beverly" when describing their stories, but "Tucker" and "Lowry" 
when discussing their roles as criminal defendant and author, respectively. 
9. Although the drug-free Karla Tucker who emerges is the central character of this book, 
Lowry is too subtle to press the point that Texas executes by lethal injection. 
10. LoWRY, supra note 1, at 127. 
11. ld. at 37. 
12. ld. at 50. 
404 REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES [Vol. 2:401 
spending the night with him. The legal motive was robbery; after killing 
their victims, Karla and Danny carried off the Harley motorcycle for 
Karla to use in rebuilding her bike. 
LOwry's words leave no escape: the brutality of Karla Tucker's 
crime was astonishing. But according to the trial judge, a woman, the 
pickax was not what riveted Houston and made this crime sufficiently 
sensational for the prosecutor to successfully seek death against a 
woman. It was also Karla's cold, outrageous, astounding claim that kill-
ing the victims gave her an orgasm.13 Audio tapes of Karla's boasts are 
part of the trial record14 and of Lowry's story. Lowry tells us that Karla 
"sounds chillingly hard and tough, with a bone-hard Texas accent. She 
is cold and unfeeling, nothing at all like the girl she is today. Listening, 
you have to wonder, so where were her feelings in those days-lost, bur-
ied, or what?"IS 
To mUrder with hammer and pickax for Harley parts, and then to 
gloat about deriving sexual satisfaction from the murder, sounds evil. 
More than that, it sounds like male evil. Here is the blatant connection 
between brutality and sex that many feminists maintain is part of being a 
man. 16 This is the ugly flip-side of gender break-through. 
Through her murders, Karla Faye Tucker transcended her gender. 
Her deed was incomprehensible and sufficiently inhuman to strip away 
her identity as a person who deserves to live; as a woman. Karla's jury 
needed only three hours of deliberation to reach a death verdict. Karla's 
awful crime transformed her into an object of horror, a symbol of evil 
who had lost her claim to humanity. 
13. Karla used slang, stating that the killing caused her to "get a nut." Id. at 155. 
14. The chief prosecution evidence was a tape secretly recorded by Danny's brother, after he 
and his then-girlfriend, Karla's sister, decided to tum in Danny and Karla. On the tape, the brother 
asked Karla whether she actually derived sexual pleasure from the killing. She answered, "Well, hell 
yes." At the end of his argument, the prosecutor asked rhetorica1Iy whether Karla deserved death, 
and then played what Lowry describes as her "brash, drug-husky" answer from the tape. Id. at 180. 
15. Id. at 92. 
16. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: 
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 122 (1984) ("The fate of many young black men in this society, whose 
lives are characterized by cycles of violence that usually climax in the death of others or their own 
deaths, epitomizes the peril of trying to actualize the fantasy of masculinity that is socially con-
structed .•.• "); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 32-47 (1987); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
127 (1989) ("The male sexual role ••. centers on aggressive intrusion on those with less power. Such 
acts of dominance are experienced as sexually arousing, as sex itself.") [hereinafter MACKINNON, 
TOWARD]; see also JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN: EssAYS ON SEX AND JUSTICE 
(1989); cf. MYRIAM MIEDZIAN, Boys WILL BE Boys (1991) (presenting strategies to break link 
between masculinity and violence); JUNE STEPHENSON, MEN ARE NOT COST-EFFECTIVE: MALE 
CRIME IN AMERICA (1991) (discussing crime as male phenomenon). 
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At first, novelist Beverly Lowry,17 too, was grabbed by Karla 
Tucker as a symbol. Beverly could not put aside a photograph of Karla 
from a Houston newspaper. The reporter's account of Karla's evil crime, 
juxtaposed with the newspaper image of Karla in jail, in which she 
appeared as an image of goodness, captivated Beverly. Although Lowry 
uses the ungendered labels of evil and good, the transformation also fol-
lows well-entrenched gender roles. Karla in prison is sweet, affectionate, 
and loving. In short, she is exactly how most people think a girl should 
be. 
The photo stayed with Beverly at a time when she was reeling, 
almost overcome, by the pain of her teenaged son's death in a hit and run 
incident. "The state I was in at the time, I envied her. I wondered if you 
had to go to jail to get calm again."IS 
Beverly wanted to meet the girl whose life swung from darkness to 
hope. Beverly's son's death was a sudden blow that hadn't stopped. 
"Dead is dead. I had to figure out a way to swallow that.,,19 When 
Beverly first noticed Karla's picture, Karla was already condemned, 
legally near death, although that was never how she acted. Bevei'ly 
found Karla at a time when Beverly was struggling with questions about 
death and redemption. For Beverly, choosing to meet and befriend 
Karla meant taking some control, being willing to risk losing someone 
else, and perhaps simply being willing to risk. 
Crossed Over is stunning not simply because Karla Faye Tucker's 
life-her bone-chilling past and her loving, decent present-is described 
so powerfully. Lowry faces herself, too, and this odd friendship. Crossed 
Over is about Beverly and Karla and what they mean to each other. 
The story was Karla's voice. Her gestures, emphases, choices; which 
information she considered crucial and which beside the point; the 
order in which she brought some things up and avoided some others. 
The story was what I was doing on Death Row, what questions I asked 
and avoided and what her story did to and for me.20 
Karla's and Beverly's stories weave back and forth until the boundaries 
wear away. 
17. Lowry's novels are COME BACK, LoLLY RAy, EMMA BLUE, DADDY'S GIRL, THE PER-
FECT SONYA, and BREAKING GENTLE. 
18. LoWRY, supra note 1, at 13. 
19. ld. at 186. 
20. ld. at 143. 
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III. CARING ABOUT DEATH ROW 
Legal theorists unaccustomed to valuing memoirs on their own 
terms might approach this book as an illustration of the ethic of care 
promoted by relational feminists.21 Do women care more? Robin West 
has described women's deep groun~g in our capacity for connection: 
"Women's concept of value revolves not around the axis of autonomy, 
individuality, justice and rights, as does men's, but instead around the 
axis of intimacy, nurturance, community, responsibility and care.,,22 
Similarly, moral philosopher Nel Noddings has built her philosophy of 
caring on values and methods inherent in what she also identifies as a 
female capacity for connection.23 Noddings has applied her concept of 
caring specifically to the problem of punishing crime: 
Suppose, for example, that we are considering appropriate punishment 
for one who has committed a particular crime. The traditional 
approach, that of the father, is to ask under what principle the case 
falls. But the mother may wish to ask more about the CUlprit and his 
victims. She may begin by thinking, "What if this were my child?,,24 
21. Much of relational feminism is grounded in some WaY on the work of psychologists Nancy 
Chodorow and Carol Gilligan. ,See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUcnON OF MOTHERING: 
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND TH~ SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Legal scholarship build-
ing on relational feminist concepts includeS: Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory 
and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Cairie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Specu-
lations on a Wo~en's Lawy~ring Process, 1 'BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Judith Resnik, On 
the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 
(1988); Sherry, supra note 6. For commentary adopting the label "relational feminism" to describe 
these ideas about women's differences, see, for example, Karen Offen, Defining Feminism: A Com-
parative Historical Approach, 14 SIGNS 119, 135 (1988), and Joan C. Williams, Deconstructillg Gel/-
der, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 802-13 (1989) (critical of relational feminism). 
The ethic of care is also associated with an Afrocentric standpoint. See PATRICIA HILL COL-
LINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF 
EMPOWERMENT 215-19 (1990). ''The convergence of Afrocentric and feminist values in the ethic of 
caring seems particularly acute." ld. at 217. See also Sandra'Harding, The Curious Coincidence of 
Feminine and African Moralities: Challengesfor Feminist Theory, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 
296 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds" 1987). 
22. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 28 (1988). 
23. NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION 
(1984). 
24. ld. at 36-37. Noddings claims that the "feminine" approach that she identifies with the 
mother is neither accepted by all women or rejected by all men, or even necessarily more typical of 
women than men. ld. at 2. She has elaborated on how the traditional ethic of justice differs from 
her concept of an ethic of caring: 
..•. The first moves immediately to abstraction where its thinking can take place clearly 
and logically in isolation from the complicating factors of particular persons, places, and 
circumstances; the second moves to concretization where its feeling can be modified by the 
introduction of facts, the feelings of others, and personal histories. 
ld. at 36-37. 
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Crossed Over is a literary (and almost literal) exhibit of Noddings' 
moral philosophy of caring. Beverly's identity as a mother informs her 
entire account.25 Her passion to tell Karla's story is the passion to 
understand Karla's mother and cannot be separated from Beverly's need 
to tell the story of her son's life and death. Beverly writes as a mother 
who sometimes relates to Karla as if Karla was her child, sometimes as if 
Beverly was Karla's mother, which is different, and sometimes as if 
Karla was the one who killed Beverly's own child, which is very 
different. 
Karla says 1 remind her of her "mother sometimes .... "Your hands," 
she once said. "You have small hands like Mother." My hands are 
not small at all; 1 laid one hand against the plexiglas to show her. 
Karla placed hers against mine, through the plastic. "I thought they 
were small," she said. 
We are locked together, she and I, in this odd union of forgive-
ness, guilt, and a rock-bottom faith in impulse and mystery.26 
Crossed Over illustrates not only the ethic of care, but a "methodol-
ogy of care" as well. Lowry addressed herself to Karla's situation by 
talking with everyone who had "anything to do With Karla's crimes, her 
case, and her life on death row. Lowry talked with all of these people 
and reported their mannerisms and words, searching to discover what 
Karla's situation "meant to them and what each of them meant to Beverly 
herself. Lowry's personal searching models Noddings' caring approach 
to the issue of capital punishment: " 
We must ask, then, after the effects of capital punishment on jurors, on 
judges, on jailers, on wardens, on newspersons "covering" the execu-
tion, on ministers visiting the condemned, on citizens affirming the sen-
tence, on doctors certifying first that the condemned is well enough to 
be executed and second that he is dead.27 
Noddings' ethic of caring rejects the overarching, neutral principles 
of conventional moral reasoning: 
1 do not begin by saying, "Capital punishment is wrong." Thus 1 do 
not fall into the trap of having to supply reasons for its wrongness that 
will be endlessly disputed at a logical level. . . . 1 may point to the 
irrevocability of the decision, but this is not in itself decisive, even for 
me, because in many cases the decision would be just and 1 could not 
25. Noddings suggests that "[t]he father might sacrifice his own child in fulfilling a principle; 
the mother might sacrifice any principle to preserve her child." Id. at 37. 
26. LoWRY. supra note 1. at 219. 
27. NODDINGS. supra note 23. at 101. 
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regret the demise of the condemned. . .. [But] I should be able to 
respond to the condemned man's entreaty, "Help me.,,28 
Beverly Lowry responded to Karla Faye Tucker with help in the form of 
friendship but asserts no position on capital punishment.29 Crossed Over 
is her story of responding to a newspaper photo of a woman on death 
row, becoming her loving friend, and writing about it. 
Of course, connectedness has its risks. Perhaps the celebration of a 
mother's capacity to nurture is a not-so-new and still-dangerous trap for 
women.30 The female values and methods that West and Noddings iden-
tify and celebrate are also used to justify our powerlessness.31 Nobody 
confuses willy-nilly emotional connectedness with strength.32 Even rela-
tional feminists acknowledge the potential ambush in exploiting women's 
capacity for connectedness. Carol Gilligan has conceded the trap of 
over-reliance on women's different voice: 
The strength of women's moral perceptions lies in the refusal of 
detachment and depersonalization, and insistence on making connec-
tions that can lead to seeing the person killed in war or living in pov-
erty as someone's son or father or brother or sister, or mother, or 
28. ld. Similarly, Noddings argues that "[caring] does not say, 'Thou shalt not kill,' and then 
seek other principles under which killing is, after all, justified." ld. 
29. Karla Faye Tucker also takes no position on capital punishment. Karla wants to be viewed 
as a person; she leaves to others the just response to her crimes. "We are not just these horrible 
things in here, we're normal people. We may have done a terrible thing, but we're humans. I don't 
mind dying for what I've done, but I would like that to be known." LoWRY, supra note 1, at 221. 
30. Drucilla Cornell presents the dilemma this way: 
If there is to be feminism at all, as a movement unique to women, we must rely on a 
feminine voice and a feminine "reality" that can be identified as such and correlated with 
the lives of actual women. Yet all accounts of the Feminine seem to reset the trap of rigid 
gender identities, deny the real differences among women (white women have certainly 
been reminded of this danger by women of color), and reflect the history of oppression and 
discrimination rather than an ideal to which we oUght to aspire. 
Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 
644, 644-45 (1990). 
31. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE STANDARD EDmON OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD: VOLUME XIX, THE EGo AND THE ID AND OrnER WORKS 257· 
58 (James Strachey trans., ed., 1968) (claiming that women "show less sense ofjustice than men, ••• 
[and] are more often influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection or hostility"); Arthur 
Schopenhauer, On Women, in PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN 228 (Mary Briody Mahowald ed., 1978): 
The weakness of their [women's] reasoning faculty also explains why is it that women show 
more sympathy for the unfortunate than men do, and so treat them with more kindness 
and interest; and why it is that, on the contrary, they are inferior to men in point of justice, 
and less honorable and conscientious. For it is just because their reasoning power is weak 
and present circumstances have such a hold over them, and those concrete things which lie 
directly before their eyes exercise a power which is seldom counteracted to any extent by 
abstract principles of thought, by fixed rules of conduct, firm resolutions, or, in general, by 
consideration for the past and the future, or in regard of what is absent or remote. 
32. For a discussion (If the limitations of empathy itself, without grounding in principles to 
distinguish between objects of empathy, see Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the 
Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989). 
1992] REVIEW ESSAY 
daughter, or friend. But the liability of women's development is ... 
that women, possessed by the spirits of others, also are more likely to 
be caught in a chain of false attachments.33 
409 
The risk of false attachment is nothing less than loss of one's self. 
Lowry's friends advised against visiting Karla Faye Tucker, the death 
row killer whose newspaper photograph somehow captured Lowry's 
imagination. Beverly herself sensed danger. 
I did not want to go soft on this girl, I did not want to get attached, I 
wanted to keep Karla Faye Tucker at a safe remove.34 
Beverly's entanglement came at some risk; she did go soft. Is Crossed 
Over the diary of a false attachment? 
Crossed Over answers the question. Karla's friendship helps Beverly 
to construct a new version of her own life after her son's death. Karla 
helps Beverly to be in the world again, and to understand the world more 
clearly. "We bring each other news, stories. Life.,,35 Beverly's son's 
death was victimization; choosing to become friends with Karla was liv-
ing again. Beverly did not lose her identity in this intense connection. 
Beverly did not disappear. 
By describing Crossed Over as the ethic of caring in action, I do not 
mean to align Beverly Lowry, Karla Tucker, or myself to that particular 
strain of feminism. What Alison Jagger calls "valorizing women's differ-
ences,,36 is a noble and enabling reclamation project, with the thrill and 
excesses of any well-chosen romance. The thrill is the excitement of see-
ing our lives in a new light, the justice in putting women first. The 
excesses, however, include romanticizing motherhood,37 replicating 
overly simplistic gender dichotomies,38 universalizing as "female" the 
limited experiences of privileged women,39 and ignoring broad social jus-
tice in favor of a narrow, isolated focus on personal traits or decisions.40 
33. Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in WOMEN AND MORAL THE-
ORY, supra note 21, at 19, 32. 
34. LoWRY, supra note 1, at 23. 
35. Id. at 219. 
36. Alison M. Jagger, Sexual Difference and Sexual Equality, in THEORETICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES, supra note 6, at 239, 247. 
37. See ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD As EXPERIENCE AND INSTITU-
TION (10th anniversary ed. 1986). 
38. See. e.g., Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLmCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRmQUE 453, 458 (David Kairys ed., 1990). 
39. See. e.g., Celina Romany, Ain't I a Feminist?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23, 25-28 (1991). 
40. See Marilyn Friedman, Care and Context in Moral Reasoning, in WOMEN AND MORAL 
THEORY, supra note 21, at 190, 202. 
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In fact, Crossed Over's excruciating details of life in the women's 
community of death row powerfully illustrate the risk of converting 
female culture into escapism within a hideous cage of powerlessness. 
Much of the life that Karla is making with her friends on death row is an 
almost infantilized41 parody of compelled feminine culture: cooking, 
sewing, and service to others. That the cooking includes a myriad of 
made-up recipes using cream cheese and Wyler's Cool-off drink mix 
(available from the commissary), that much of the sewing is a prison 
industry of "parole pal" cloth dolls made to customer specification, and 
that the service to others includes preparing outfits for each other's court 
appearances, could illustrate the radical feminist indictment that the 
women's culture celebrated by relational feminists is nothing more than 
accommodation to subordination.42 
Crossed Over is a manifestation of caring, not a manifesto. Lowry 
has created an important book about the political and legal controversy 
over capital punishment without a word about the policy principles that 
usually frame this debate. Instead, Lowry threw herself into Tucker's 
. story and became not simply connected, but committed and devoted as 
well. By lovingly painting a picture of the young friend who is Karla 
Faye Tucker, Lowry chooses life for Karla Faye.43 Lowry's readers will, 
toO.44 
IV. EXECUTIONS AND FEMINISM 
What of my insistence that feminists should spend precious 
resources-including these pages-considering death row? As Lowry 
acknowledged early on, "[I]f I needed a cause, there were plenty of far 
more <;leserving people out there to feel sorry for."4s We live in a world 
41. When Beverly met Karla in March of 1989, Karla was 29 but seemed more like a thirteen-
year-old. LoWRY, supra note 1, at 25. 
42. See. e.g., MAcKINNON, TOWARD, supra note 16, at 51 ("[F]or women to affirm differences 
is to affirm the qualities and characteristics of powerlessness."); Isabel Marcus et al., Feminist Dis-
course. Moral Values. and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 11 (1985); Williams, supra 
note 21, at 801 (criticizing relational feminism as "inaccurate and potentially destructive"). 
43. CROSSED OVER is dedicated "For Karla: long life." 
44. The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is the 
extension of our sympathies. Appeals founded on generalizations and statistics require a 
sympathy ready-made, a moral sentiment already in activity; but a picture of life such a 
great artist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is 
apart from themselves, which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment. 
GEORGE ELIOT, THE NATURAL HIsTORY OF GERMAN LIFE (1856) (quoted in JAMES BOYD 
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 240 (1985». 
45. LoWRY, supra note I, at 10. 
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in which women who have committed no crimes suffer unendurable vio-
lence. And even within our concern for imprisoned women, why focus 
on capital punishment when death row is roughly as open to women as 
the United States Senate? Why is the death penalty abolitionist commu-
nity filled with so many strong feminists who might otherwise be engaged 
in projects benefitting women more directly?46 I have come to believe 
that our choice of this work signals an authentic connection between 
feminism and opposition to executions,47 not a false attachment.48 
My argument is not that feminists should oppose executions because 
violence is male, or because women's nature is nonviolent. Such claims 
obscure the more complicated and perhaps distressing reality.49 Capital 
punishment is the kind of sanitized, institutionalized violence in which 
modem women and men participate from a safe distance. 50 As Robert 
Cover has reminded us, maintaining capital punishment requires that 
distance. 51 Feminists should work against the death penalty not because 
women are nonviolent, but because the opposite is true. Opposition to 
executions is a political choice of women and men, all of whom have the 
capacity for violence and destruction. S2 
46. Feminist legal academics also have contributed their share of death penalty co=entary. 
See. e.g., Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution. Punishment. and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 973 (1985); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respectfor Persons: Super Due Process/or Death, 53 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1980) [hereinafter Radin; Cruel Punishment]; Margaret Jane Radin, Proportion-
ality. Subjectivity. and Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1165 (1985) [hereinafter Radin, Proportion-
ality]; Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases 
From the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssUES 161 (1990). 
47. Conversely, the successful campaign to unseat former California Chief Justice Rose E. Bird 
was a powerful marriage between enthusiasm for executions and misogyny. See also DAVID G. 
SAVAGE, TuRNING RiGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUISr SUPREME CoURT 34 (1992) 
(recounting that then-law clerk William Rehnquist complained in a note to Justice Jackson that the 
"highest court of the nation .•. behave[s] like a bunch of old women" when addressing capital 
cases). ' 
48. But see Radin, Proportionality, supra note 46, at 1175 (suggesting that energy given to 
death penalty concerns may "distractO us from the real tragedy of everyday suffering"). 
49. See. e.g., Angela West, Prosecutorial Activism: Confronting Heterosexism in a Lesbian Bat-
tering Case, 15lIARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 249, 256 (1992) (recounting that West's belief that "[w]omen 
aren't aggressive" or "violent by nature" clouded her ability to understand a lesbian battering). For 
a discussion of the risks of romanticizing women's differences, see supra notes 36-40 and accompa-
nying text. 
50. "[A]1most all people are fascinated and attracted by violence, even though they are at the 
same time repelled by it." Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1613 
(1986). 
51. ld. at 1623-25. 
52. bell hooks has made a similar point about militarism: 
We who are concerned about feminism and militarism must insist that women (even those 
who are bearers of children) are not inherently non-violent or life-affirming .•.. We must 
insist that women who do choose (even if they are inspired by motherhood) to denounce 
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A variety of policy and theoretical reasons justify this political 
choice for feminists. The death penalty is a key aspect of current crime 
policy in the United States and feminists are actively engaged in policy 
debates about crime, especially as related to violence against women. S3 
Yet, relatively little feminist work has focused on punishment for those 
crimes, except to reflect an uncritical attachment to incarceration by edu-
cating about the seriousness of crimes against women and promoting 
lengthier periods of incarceration for those convicted of such crimes. 54 
Willingness to support executions (however reluctantly) has become such 
a powerful'signifier for caring about crime victims that, to the extent that 
feminists decry violent crime without addressing feminist punishment or 
prevention issues, executions are done for us.5S 
Yet, executions impede the feminist goal of reducing violent' crime. 
Executions do not make the streets safer, S6 but they stand in for pro-
grams that could. Effective anti-crime programs-paid work leaves, 
more accessible child care, and community dispute-resolution pro-
gramsS7-sound remarkably like feminist programs, irrespective of their 
impact on crime. The ritual execution of a person is such a powerful 
symbolic act that it has become a substitute for, and thus an impediment 
to, implementation of these more effective policies. In other words, even 
violence and domination and its ultimate expression, war, are political thinkers making 
political decisions and choices. 
HOOKS, supra note 16, at 128. See also CLAUDIA KOONZ, MOTHERS IN THE FATHERLAND: 
WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND NAZI POLmcs (1987) (discussing participation of women in Nazi 
Germany); ADRIENNE RICH, For Ethel Rosenberg, in A WILD PATIENCE HAS TAKEN ME THIs 
FAR: POEMS 1978-1981, 26, 29-30 (1981): 
since if I imagine her at all 
I have to imagine first 
the pain inflicted 'on her by women 
her mother testifies against her 
her sister-in-law testifies against her 
and how she sees it[.] 
53. The most influential work includes SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, 
WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); SUSAN EsnuCH, REAL RAPE (1987); DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 
(1976); FEMICIDE: THE POLmcs OF WOMAN KILLING (Jill Radford & Diana E.H. Russell ed5., 
1992) [hereinafter FEMICIDE]. 
54. E.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 53, at 426. 
55. Similarly, bell hooks has reminded us that much male violence is exerted "for" women: 
"Often a male hero has to exert harsher violence to subdue a villain. • .• His acts of violence in the 
interest of proteCtion are seen as a gesture of care, of his 'love' for women and his concern for 
humanity." HOOKS, supra note 16, at ~23. 
56. Most proponents of the death penalty justify it on moral grounds. Some studies sUllgest 
that executions provoke homicides rather than deter them. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMI-
CIDE: DEATIl As PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982271-336 (1984) (evaluating data related to 
deterrence or brutalization from executions). 
57. See, e.g., ELLIOTI CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE 276 
(1985). 
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if feminists are solely concerned with slowing Violence against women, 
dislodging the death penalty would help. 58 Perhaps this is merely 
another illustration of bell hooks' admonition that "efforts to end male 
violence against women will succeed only if they are part of an overall 
struggle to end violence."59 
Not only are executions powerful symbolic rituals that distract from 
feminist programs, but the ritual itself is deeply gendered. Capital pun-
, ishment, using law to kill people, is gendered even though-or perhaps 
because-death penalty laws are overwhelmingly used to kill men. 
Feminism is a theory for understanding the gender of law, even 
when it is not directly pointed at women.60 Ngaire Naffine has explained 
why feminist critiques of the law are not limited to a narrow class of 
issues: 
[The problem for women] is that law presents itself in a way which is 
specifically designed to demonstrate its essential neutrality in relation 
to the sexes (and other social categories) while in fact the very mode of 
its self-presentation is deeply gendered. . .. In other words, the con-
cepts invoked by law to demonstrate its essential justness--concepts 
such as 'impartiality,' 'objectivity,' and 'rationality,' are gender-biased 
in their very construction.61 
The looming questions of power and morality in capital punishment 
make it a prime candidate for the feminist project of revealing the gender 
in avowedly gender-neutral legal doctrines and procedures. Robert 
Cover wrote about the death penalty in part because he understood that 
58. In addition, feminists might offer better ways to spend the money currently expended try-
ing to kill people. See Stephenson, supra note 16, at 20 (suggesting that male crime costs taxpayers 
too much money and pointing out that abolishing the death penalty would save millions). See also 
Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dol/ars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1221 (1985) (assessing the financial cost of capital punishment). 
59. HOOKS, supra note 16, at 123. In the same chapter, "Feminist Movement to End Vio-
lence," bell hooks credits feminists with successfully calling attention to the need to end male vio-
lence against women, but suggests that "[b]y concentrating solely on ending male violence against 
women, feminist activists may overlook the severity of the problem." Id. at 119. 
60. See. e.g., MACKINNON, TOWARD, supra note 16, at 238 ("In the liberal state, the rule of 
law-neutral, abstract, elevated, pervasive-both institutionalizes the power of men over women and 
institutionalizes power in its male form."); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: 
The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886, 892 (1989) 
("Thus, legal language and reasoning is gendered, and that gender matches the male gender of its 
linguistic architects.") 
61. NGAIRE NAFFINE, LAW AND THE SEXES: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 
3 (1990). 
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"[c]apital cases ... disclose far more of the structure of judicial interpre-
tation than do other cases. "62 The raw power of law is most extreme 
when it is used to kill people.63 
The execution is a ritual by which law-abiding people reclaim power 
from criminals.64 Capital punishment objectifies in two directions. It 
idealizes the legal system as powerful and just, arid it transforms the per-
son being executed from a flesh and blood human beiI?-g into a symbol of 
evil.6s Capital punishment converts persons who have (usually) commit-
ted terrible crimes into symbolic, ritualized objects of sacrifice. This 
symbol of evil66 is eradicated to make us feel as though we are doing 
something powerful in the face of overwhelming, frightening acts of vio-
lence. The victimizer becomes the victim. Why do so few women fill this 
particular victim role? 
Efforts to discover why women are rarely sentenced to death are just 
beginning.67 My partial explanation for the relative lack of women on 
death rows is the bad fit between commonly understood images of what it 
means to be a woman and the symbolic role of the person being put to 
death. In other words, what it means to be a woman does not match 
what it means to be a person deserving of execution. 
The person to be executed becomes an objectified symbol of power-
ful, inhuman evil. Although women are often identified with evil,68 
women are infrequently given the particular symbolic role of condemned 
prisoner for two interrelated reasons: (I) unlike men, we rarely have the 
power to frighten; and (2) we are not as easily separated from our 
62. See Cover, supra note 50, at 1623. 
63. Robin West suggests that "feminist legal theorists should keep our focus on patriarchlll 
violence .... " Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 
62. I am arguing that executions are a form of patriarchal violence. 
64. The indictment against Karla Tucker charged that her crime offended "the peace and dig-
nity of the state." . 
65. See KING, supra note 7, at 155 (stating that "capital punishment is the ultimate form of 
dehumanization"). 
66. See, e.g., id., at xiii (suggesting that the "a priori assignation of evil to black in Western 
culture and society" influenced the Black defendant's fate). 
67. Professor Streib suggests that the infrequency with which women are condemned to die 
suggests inherent gender bias in favor of women, in addition to the fact that women tend to commit 
fewer and less heinous crimes. Streib, supra note 4, at 193; Streib, supra note 3, at 874-77. Professor 
Rapaport presents a more explicitly feminist interpretation of the data, suggesting that capital sen-
tencing for a woman is "rare" and "anomalous" not because of some gender discrimination thnt 
disadvantages men, Qut because "women rarely commit the kinds of murders that are subject to 
capital punishment." Rapaport, Some Questions, supra note 3, at 509. She concludes that the "lim-
ited information available suggests that women may be reaping both the rigors of equality and the 
detriments of the widespread suspicion of privilege." Id. 
68. E.g., NEL NODDINGS, WOMEN AND EVIL 35-58 (1989). 
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humanity as are men. The potential for a particular woman to break 
through this symbolic gender incompatibility is bound up with her crime, 
race, and economic status, and perhaps her sexual orientation as well.69 
The first issue is power. Because executions are public rituals by 
which the law-abiding population reclaims power from criminals, the 
person to be executed must embody some kind of power. Executing a 
woman does not feel sufficiently powerful for it to relieve us of much 
anxiety about personal safety.70 
Which women have embodied sufficient power to frighten, thereby 
breaking through the gender barrier? Since death sentences resumed fol-
lowing Furman v. Georgia 71 in 1972, seventy death sentences have been 
imposed on sixty-seven girls and women,· one of whom has been exe-
cuted.72 As discussed above,73 most of these women were convicted of 
murders that seemed more characteristic of men than of women. Karla 
Tucker is typical of the pattern. Karla's evil was stereotypically male. 
Karla's transformation has confused the picture. Now that she is good, 
has somehow reverted to being a regular girl, support for her execution 
has diminished.74 Karla's power to frighten was wrapped up with her 
cloak of male bravado. Karla's current state of sweet girlishness makes 
many people squeamish about executing her. Men who find religion and 
lead decent lives on death row still carry with them the implicit threat of 
their maleness. 
The historical record suggests a different kind of frightening power. 
Many of the women who were executed committed crimes that are more 
easily understood as women's crimes. Almost half of the 400 or so 
69. See Victoria A. Brownworth, Dykes on Death Row, THE ADVOCATE, June 19, 1992, at 82, 
84 (reporting that "[o]ut of the nation's 41 female death-row inmates, at least 17 are lesbians, and 
three of these women were sentenced this year"); Ruthann Robson, Legal Lesbicide, in FEMICIDE, 
supra note 53, at 40 (discussing "legal murder of women because of their lesbianism" within Euro-
pean and Anglo-American legal history). 
70. In other words, in my vision, the Senate and death rows are both filled with men because 
few women have the power to command leadership or·the power to command fear. 
71. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
72. See Streib, supra note 3, at 867. Of "the sixty-four cases in which race is known, 70% were 
white and only 25% were black. One American Indian, Doris Foster in Maryland, received two 
death sentences (1982 and 1984) but in 1986 her sentence was commuted to life in prison." [d.. at 
869. 
73. See supra note 5. 
74. The brother of one of Karla's victims is now opposed to her execution: "What I saw when 
I spoke to her ... was something totally different from what I saw eight or nine years ago when the 
trial was going on." Texas Set to Execute First Woman Since 1863, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, at 
17. 
416 REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES [Vol. 2:401 
women executed in this country since 1632 were slaves.7s The majority 
of these were executed for killing their master, mistress, or a member of 
their owner's family, usually by poisoning them.76 The kitchen slave's 
ability to poison her owner--silently, slowly, with no signs of anger or 
violence-gave her what appeared to the law as truly frightening 
power.77 What other crime embodied frightening power in women? 
After homicide, the crime for which most American women have been 
executed is witchcraft.78 
The second crucial symbolic requirement for a person to be fairly 
executed is potential for dehumanization. An execution has legitimacy if 
the person being executed is easily perceived as inhuman.79 Not only are 
few women sufficiently frightening to make executing us an exercise of 
real power, but many women are less easily dehumanized than men 
because of our more readily recognized relational bonds.80 Consider the 
petition to the Governor signed by thirty men on California's death row 
volunteering to draw straws to be executed in the place of Eithel Spinelli, 
who was executed by California in 1941. The condemned men argued 
that "the execution of a woman would hurt California in the eyes of the 
world.,,81 The men on death row volunteered to take Eithel Spinelli's 
place in the gas chamber in part because she was a mother.82 The likeli-
hood that many of the signators were fathers reveals the gendered way in 
which parenthood signifies human bonds. 
75. "Of the 398 executed female offenders, at least 189 (47%) are known to have been slaves. 
All but one were blacks, the other being an American Indian (Ms. Clapham, 1763, Michigan)." 
Streib, supra note 3, 'at 853 (footnote omitted). Most of these slaves were executed for conduct 
'unbecoming a slave, classified variously as rebellion or petty treason. "Female slaves account for all 
of the female executions for the crimes of arson, assault, attempted arson, and petty treason," ld. 
76. Of the female slaves executed for homicide, 61% were killed for killing their owner or a 
member of his or her family, 32% for killing an unrelated victim, and 6% for killing their own 
newborn baby. ld. at 853-54. 
77. According to Professor Streib, "[w]hi1e many were cases of clear intent to poison by mixing 
lethal substances with the food being prepared, many of the cases probably involved food poisoning 
from lack of available refrigeration and other methods of preserving food," ld, at 854. 
78. See id. at 852, Table 2 (27 women were executed for witchcraft, constituting 7% of total), 
Adrienne Rich evoked these witches in her poem about the most famous woman executed in the 
United States, "For Ethel Rosenberg" ("she feels no pain at all she finally burned to death like so 
many"). RICH, supra note 52, at 29. 
79. For a powerful call for greater judicial use of narrative to reveal the ties of the capital 
defendant and his crimes to the rest of us, see West, supra note 46. 
80. Women's relational bonds are reflected in our crimes. See CAROL SMART, WOMEN, 
CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY: A FEMINISf CRmQuE 16-17 (1986); see also Streib, supra note 3, at 
851. 
81. Rapaport, Some Questions, supra note 3, at 501. 
82. Id. 
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Of course, the question of who embodies frightening power and who 
embodies relational bonds are related to each other and to race and class, 
either in addition to or as part of gender. F'or example, the prevalence of 
Black men on death row who have been convicted of murdering white 
people83 reflects (for predominantly white legal decisionmakers) a para-
digm of frightening power and unrecognized relational bonds. The his-
toric prevalence of Black women slaves being executed for poisoning 
their masters' food suggests a congruence between extremely frightening 
power and no perception of those women's relational bonds. 
Thus, even the scarcity of women on death row reveals an important 
and ominous message for feminists. If part of what it means to be a 
woman is not to be sentenced to death, the womanhood of those who 
were executed was invisible before the law. That the majority of women 
who have been executed were Black84 reveals that the protection of 
womanhood was really the protection of white womanhood. Barbara 
Smith explains that "[w]hen you read about Black women being lynched, 
they aren't thinking of us as females. The horrors that we have exper-
ienced have absolutely everything to do with them not even viewing us as 
women.,,8S 
Although the racial imbalance of women sentenced to die is lessen-
ing somewhat,86 the fact that we currently sentence to death exclusively 
poor women suggests that the construction of womanhood is class-
bound, too. In other words, if feminists distance ourselves from concern 
about the death penalty because women are not executed, we are using as 
our reference for "women" white women who stay within defined class 
boundaries, act like ladies, and injure only people poorer than 
themselves. 
83. For example, an exhaustive study of Georgia's capital sentencing practices revealed that 
prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving Black defendants and white 
victims, 15% of the cases involving Black defendants and Black victims, and 19% of the cases 
involving white defendants and Black victims. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987). See 
infra pp. 419-21 (discussing racial bias in capital punishment). 
84. Two-thirds of all executed female offenders were Black, although the percentage is "only 
34%" for this century's executions so far. "Blacks constituted 5% of those executed females for 
whom race is known in the seventeenth century .... However, only 34% of the females executed so 
far in the twentieth century were black." Streib, supra note 3, at 856-57. See also KING, supra note 
7, at 148 ("And in America, black people have often been used to symbolize (as illustrated by the 
portrayal of Andrew Green in contemporary newspapers) everything white people are not."). 
85. Barbara Smith, quoted in ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF 
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST 'THOUGHT 37 (1988). 
86. BlacJc women are sentenced to death in greater proportion to their population, although 
modern percentages are much less than they were in earlier centuries and much less than Black men 
are today. See Streib, supra note 3, at 868·69. 
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The symbolic impact of executions on the law also deserves feminist 
attention. As the person on death row is objectified/destroyed, the legal 
process that carries out the execution is objectified/glorified. The death 
penalty ritual is a symbolic power surge that reflects and builds the 
power of law. Each execution sends an arrogant message, boasting that 
the legal system is capable of using its own rules to convert killing a 
person into something lawful. The legal process and its participants 
absorb and assume the power rendered by the execution. 
The legitimacy of the killing is provided by the fact that the proce-
dures in place are relentlessly neutral: clean, distant, and equally avail-
able to every death row inmate. Consider Hamilton v. Texas,87 another 
capital case from Houston, in which a successful petition for a writ of 
certiorari was brought on behalf of James Edward Smith. Although the 
petition received the requisite four votes to be placed on the Supreme 
Court's calendar, Smith failed to get the required fifth vote on the accom-
panying request for a stay of his 'execution pending resolution of his case 
before the Court. Thus, shortly after the Court took Smith's case, that 
action was rendered moot by 'Smith's execution in Texas. Killing Smith 
was lawful and fair because it was done by these well-established, bru-
tally mechanistic rules. 88 According to the Texas authorities who 
pressed forward with Smith's execution, waiting for the Supreme Court 
to decide Smith's still-pending cases would have been lawlessness. How 
do you explain that to a client, or .tQ his children, or to his mother? 
Smith's execution is an unusually dramatic example of the power of 
capital procedures, but even ordinary death penalty cases reveal the awe-
some power of the legal process and its decisionmakers. I wonder about 
explaining a five to four appellate decision for death to a client. A mar-
gin of one is not sufficient to declare the winner in a game of ping-pong, 
but we routinely execute on a one-vote margin.89 Supporting executions 
87. 110 S. Ct. 3262 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay). Smith 
had abandoned the appeals of his conviction for a 1984 felony murder and volunteered to be exe-
cuted. The petition for certioniri was brought on his behalfby his mother, Alexzene Hamilton, who 
argued that Smith's long history of mental illness rendered him incompetent to volunteer to bc 
executed. Smith had alternated between representing himself and abandoning his claims. 
88. "Law from the male point of view combines coercion with authority, policing society 
where its edges are exposed: at points of social resistance, conflict, and breakdown." MACKINNON, 
TOWARD, supra note 16, at 239. ~'[T]he state appears most relentless in imposing the male point of 
view when it comes closest to achieving its highest formal criterion of distanced aperspectivity. 
When it is most ruthlessly neutral, it is most male .••. " ld. at 248. 
89. Judaic law prohibited executions where the differential between sides was less than two 
judges. EMANUEL B. QUINT & NEIL S. HECHT, JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE: ITS SOURCES AND 
MODERN APPLICATIONS VOLUME 1 36 (1980). Other procedural safeguards were in place as well. 
For example, 
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requires believing that these legal procedures are capable of killing 
fairly.90 
In answer to my question about any connections between feminism 
and capital punishment, one of my clients suggested that feminists-like 
other outsiders with little political power-are hurt by allowing any gov-
ernment that does not include them to exercise so much raw power-the 
power to kill. Executions should concern feminists in the law precisely 
because part of the jurisprudential project of many feminists-and others 
disempowered by our relentlessly neutral laws-is to delegitimate the 
law. Executions do the opposite. 
But we do not need to oppose capital punishment simply because of 
an impulse against providing too much power to a legal system that does 
us wrong in other ways. Fem,inists should oppose capitai punishment 
because of the meaning that executions give to our concept of justice. 
Nel Noddings suggests that capital punishment must be opposed because 
it sacrifices a person's life for a principle.91 Executions represent the tri-
umph of an idealized version of Justice that hides the racist, classist, 
messy, freakish, and imperfect reality. 
The imperfections are many. Few people are surprised to learn that 
capital punishment as practiced today selects people to be executed in 
part on the basis of race92 and class.93 In addition, a huge proportion of 
Non-capital cases are decided by three and capital cases are decided by twenty-three 
judges. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction, but 
capital cases must begin with reasons for acquittal. . .• In non-capital cases they may reach 
a verdict either of acquittal or of conviction by the decision of a majority of one; but in 
capital cases they may reach a verdict of acquittal by the decision of a majority of one, but 
a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. 
ELLIOT N. DORFF & ARTHUR ROSETT, A LIVING TREE: THE RooTS AND GROWTH OF JEWISH 
LAW 262 (1988). 
90. "[T]he fact that capital punishment constitutes the most plain, the most deliberate, and the 
most thoughtful manifestation of legal interpretation as violence makes the imposition of the sen-
tence an especially powerful test of the faith and commitment of the interpreters." Cover, supra note 
50, at 1622. 
91. "I cannot kill in the name of principle or justice." NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 101. 
92. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL 
DISPARmES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989). See also Michael L. Radelet & Margaret Vandiver, 
Race and Capital Punishment: An Overview a/the Issues, CRIME & Soc. JUST., No. 25, 1986, at 94. 
93. Karla Tucker is typical of women sentenced to death in the modem era and of women 
executed in this country, who tend to be "poor, undereducated, and of the lowest social class in the 
community." Streib, supra note 3, at 878. Karla's victims were white, which is typical for women 
and men sentenced to death, but were perhaps of lower social standing than would be typical. Id. 
Support for the death penalty flourishes in spite of the widespread understanding of its ec0-
nomic bias. A 1985 Gallup'poll revealed 72% support for the death penalty, even though 64% of 
those polled felt that for the same crime the death penalty was more likely for a poor person than for 
someone with average or above average income. Faye A. Silas, The Death Penalty: The Comeback 
Picks Up Speed, A.B.A.J., April 1985, at 48, 51. 
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people on death row suffered horrifying abuse as children.94 Some of the 
people who are executed are innocent.95 What does it mean to cede that 
much power-the power of life or death-to a system of capital punish-
ment with such fundamental flaws? It suggests that those flaws do not 
count for much. It means that we have adapted to a notion of justice and 
fairness that tolerates racial and economic bias.96 
In the telling, tragic case of McCleskey v. Kemp,97 our Supreme 
Court acknowledged the existence of racial bias but suggested that trying 
to fix it, trying too hard to eliminate it, would mean dismantling our 
system of criminal justice. Warren McCleskey produced sophisticated 
statistical evidence of gross racial bias in Georgia's capital sentencing, 
including that defendants charged with killing a white were 4.3 times 
more likely to be sentenced to die than defendants charged with killing a 
Black.98 In dissent, Justice Brennan acknowledged "a significant chance 
that race would playa prominent role in determining if [a defendant] 
lived or died. "99 
The majority assumed the statistical validity of the studylOO but 
refused to find that the evidence of racial bias justified reversing Mr. 
McCleskey's sentence. Justice Powell warned that "McCleskey's claim, 
taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles 
that underlie our entire criminal justice system."lOl As Mumia Abu-
Jamal, an African-American man on death row in Pennsylvania, has 
pointed out, McCleskey's charge of racial bias "was not disproved by the 
McCleskey Court; rather, it was rejected out offear."lo2 In other words, 
faced with the choice of having the racism in the death penalty mean 
94. When invited to speak on impressions from his first months on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy discussed his almost daily exposure to capital cases, stressing that a review of 15 
such cases revealed that all 15 defendants were the victims of serious abuse as infants. In Speech. 
Kennedy Links Child Abuse and Violent Crime, L.A. DAILY J., June 13, 1988, at 1. 
95. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital 
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987). 
96. For example, a recent fax poll of California lawyers indicated that support for the death 
penalty (57%) coexists with acknowledgement that "there is racial or class bias in the imposition of 
the death penalty" (54%). Fax Poll- The Resultsfrom May, CAL. LAW., July 1992, at 104. See 
generally Nancy Levit, Expediting Death: Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due Process 
Jurisprudence in Capital Cases, 59 UMKC L. REv. 55 (1990) (applying Herbert Marcuse's theory of 
repressive tolerance to capital punishment). 
97. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
98. ld. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
99. ld. 
100. ld. at 291 n.7. 
101. ld. at 314-15. 
102. Mumia Abu-Jamal, Teetering on the Brink: Between Death and Life, 100 YALE L.J. 993, 
1000 (1991). 
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stopping many executions or having it mean nothing, the Court chose to 
protect capital punishment. 103 
Understanding capital punishment to be a legal institution that 
embodies racism and classism and reveals enormous violent repercus-
sions of child abuse, but that has little to do with feminism, would rein-
force a narrow, weak, exclusionary brand of feminism. 104 For feminists 
to ignore the death penalty because men like Warren McCleskey, James 
Edward Smith, and Mumia Abu-Jamal are more typical of death row 
than Karla Faye Tucker would make as much sense as ignoring wars 
because women are not drafted. 105 Feminists should pay attention to the 
men and women on death row, and to the way that the law is used as the 
weapon to kill them. Feminists should listen to death row stories. 
v. STORYTELLING: POETS, FRIENDS, AND LAWYERS 
Lowry's descriptions of prison visits are achingly familiar to me. 
Her account of the mi~dle-class encounter with the ceremony of visiting 
rooms, including, for example, the rituals with the vending machines, 
describes many attorney-client visits, as well. I, too, am overly nice to 
the guards. Although Lowry and I relate to the institution in similar 
ways, the relief I feel when I get out (after just a few hours in the visiting 
room) is missing from her account. In fact, my only moments of deep 
dissatisfaction with being a lawyer have come when I am back out in the 
sunshine, walking away, trying to keep relief from showing in my step. I 
see the world too sharply and long for a poet's vision. 
We are like persons who have come out of a cave or cellar into the 
open air. This is the effect on us of tropes, fables, oracles, and all 
poetic forms. Poets are thus liberating gods .... 106 
My death row visits suggest that death row representation is too big 
a task for lawyers alone; poets and friends are needed. Lowry's account 
of her relationship with Karla Faye Tucker helped me to understand. 
103. For commentaries on McCleskey, see id. at 999-1001. See also M! Shanara Gilbert, Racism 
and Retrenchment in Capital Sentencing: Judicial and Congressional Haste Toward the Ultimate 
Injustice, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 51, 52-61 (1990-91), and authority cited there. 
104. See Romany, supra note 39, at 23-24 (calling for a feminism "which launches a multi-
faceted attack on legal institutions that perpetuate substantial injustice"). 
105. See generally Stephanie A. Levin, Women and Violence: Reflections on Ending the Com-
bat Exclusion, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv. 805 (1992); Ann Scales, Militarism. Male Dominance and 
Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989); Susan Sherwin, 
Feminism and Theoretical Perspectives on Peace, 12 ATLANTIS 136 (1986). 
106. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Poet, in EssAYS (2nd ser. 1844) (quoted in WHITE, supra 
note 44, at 212). 
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this. Crossed Over helped me to understand the difference between being 
a lawyer and being a poet, and between being a lawyer and being a friend. 
Beverly Lowry is biographer and friend of Karla; she brings brutal 
honesty to both roles. Lowry writes because "if you get the story right, 
you will have made it into a kind of monument to the event itself."lo7 
Lowry brings her talent for ironic detail to the task of writing honestly 
about what she and Karla mean to each other. Lowry describes her 
work as "like a clerk doing grunt work-the listening, the studying, the 
shuffling and assembling ... trying to make connections."lOB 
It's Karla Faye's life at stake. I am the other one, her friend, her biog-
rapher, listening, attending, trying to figure out-for her, for me, for 
the record history and time will make of all this-what it is Karla 
actually has done. 109 
Lowry's gifts as a writer and her gifts as a friend to Karla seem 
based on the same strengths: attention to detail and brutal honesty. 
Near the end of their first visit, after Beverly had described her son's 
death, Karla posed a big question. Karla asked how Beverly would feel 
if the person who killed Beverly's son was found and tried, and at the 
time for punishment people said, "oh, but he's changed, he's a new per-
son now. See how good he is?"110 Beverly refused to offer the comfort-
ing lie. As Lowry says, everything happened during that first visit. 
Lowry made the "daredevil leap into friendship fast and on the spot and 
without restrictions." 111 
Lowry's words for us are as honest as her friendship. One of the 
dramas-within-the-drama was the betrayal of Karla and Danny by her 
sister and his brother, who were lovers. Karla does not blame them for 
going to the police. However, in describing Karla's trial, Lowry dis-
misses Karla's sister, Karl, as a prostitute for the prosecution ("a girl 
accustomed to short-term work"112) not because she testified against 
Karla, but because she tried to shape her words to help the prosecution 
instead of using her own truth as her anchor. 113 Lowry's commitment to 
107. LoWRY, supra note 1, at 6S. 
lOS. Id. at 4. 
109. Id. at 5. 
110. ld. at 232. 
111. ld. at 67. 
112. Id. at 172. 
113. By contrast, Lowry finds honor in the testimony of the other key prosecution witness, c0-
defendant Danny's brother, because he was testifying to tell the truth, not to benefit one side or the 
other. According to Lowry, he "is not turning a trick for either side ... he's digging, searching, 
trying to figure it out." ld. at 174. 
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honesty makes her condemn Karl and then describe her-her friend's 
own sister-in the harshest terms. 1 winced for Karla at Lowry's words. 
Out of loyalty to Karla, 1 would have protected Karl. But that's not 
what their friendship is abou~. 
Beverly's honesty is more than matched by Karla, who insists on 
facing the horrors of her crimes. Karla used her trial as a time to create 
her own moment of truth: "I wanted to tell the truth. 1 wanted the real 
story to be told. 1 had to do something about how sick-minded we must 
have been to think about something like this.,,114 In her friendship with 
Beverly, Karla requires breathtaking honesty. Karla always refers to 
"my victimS."llS She does not allow Beverly' to forget: "It is Karla her-
self who reminds me: What I did was horrible. Horrible. It is a fact of 
her life; the reason 1 know her.,,116 Beverly and Karla share each other's 
horror stories. The friends enter each other's stories, and each other's 
dreams. The poet brings us into their circle. 
Lawyering is also about telling stories,117 but with crucial differ-
ences. The revelations of lawyers and clients are not mutual; the lawyer 
tries to discover and reveal her client's story without exposing too much 
of herself. lls This revelation imbalance is especially great in death row 
lawyering, where discovering and revealing the client's story is the most 
important goal, yet the dangers to the lawyer of self-exposure and attach-
ment 100m very large. 
The one-sidedness of the disclosures is not the most important dif-
ference. Lawyerly storytelling is essentially instrumentalist. The law, as 
Lowry points out, is about winning and losing. The lawyer looks for the 
story that could win and tells it. Karla testified in order for the truth to 
be heard but her lawyers put her on the stand in order to win the case. 
"Our only chance to save her life ... was to try to humanize her. And 
114. ld. at 141. 
115. ld. at 233. 
116. ld. at 173. 
117. E.g., PatriciaA. Cain, Comment, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and 
Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945, 1954 (1988) ("What we want .•. are lawyers who can tell their 
clients' stories, lawyers who can help judges to see the parties as human beings, and who can help 
remove the separation between judge and litigant."). 
118. What of the ultimate imbalance in a relationship in which the client is told to tell 
everything to the lawyer (and it will of course be kept confidential) but the lawyer may not 
be telling everything to the client? This suggest that another form of the Golden Rule 
might be: The lawyer should be as truthful to the client as she expects the client to be with 
her. 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment· A Proposal 
for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 780 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
424 REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES [Vol. 2:401 
the only way we could do that was to let her tell her story.,,1l9 As the 
legal doctrine accommodates political goals of more and quicker execu-
tions, the death penalty lawyer must become less of a legal technician 
and more of an instrumentalist storyteller.120 As a capital defense attor-
ney, I cannot help reading Crossed Over as a tactic in the case of State v. 
Tucker. 121 So, at some level, we need poets on the team to help us tell 
winning stories. 
But needing the skill of a poet to win the case is the least of it. We 
need poets to help our clients and ourselves understand ourselves as sepa-
rate from and larger than the law.122 The lawyer represents the law to 
the client, and the client to the law. If people on death row die to legiti-
mate the power of the law, no wonder the role of their lawyers is so 
confounding. At some level, even the most wonderful death row law-
yer-especially the most wonderful death row lawyer-embodies the 
principles of fairness which justify the execution. No wonder the task is 
too big for lawyers. Lawyers need poets to help us understand ourselves 
as something other than the representatives of the legal system. We need 
to understand something other than winning and iosing. We need the 
poets. 
Lawyers' disappearance into the law is metaphorical, but the law 
threatens to destroy our clients quite literally. Our death penalty laws 
are designed to (fairly) eliminate a person, leaving only the legal princi-
ples which the case embodies. For example, Warren McCleskey was 
killed by the State of Georgia. He is survived by McCleskey 1,123 in 
which the Court rejected the sufficiency of evidence of systemic racial 
bias, and McCleskey 11,124 in which the Court imposed stringent new 
restrictions on the availability of federal habeas corpus. For many peo-
ple, being on death row is literally about one's self becoming a legal 
119. LoWRY, supra note 1, at 98. 
120. The increasingly prevalent device of acknowledging legal errors in the record of capital 
cases but finding them harmless requires appellate attorneys not merely to locate legal error, but to 
marshall enough favorable information about the client to convince the members of the court that 
the legal error mattered. See, e.g., John W. Poulos, Capital Punishment, The Legal Process, and the 
Emergence of the Lucas Court in Colifornia, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 157,277·78 (1990). 
121. Can it really be that the State of Texas will execute this young woman, friend and subject 
of a serious novelist, subject of a hardcover book from Knopf? I imagine setting up a meeting 
between my client and Alice Walker, or even Norman Mailer. See Ann Althouse, Standing, in 
Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1177, 1196 (1991) (especially note 82, in which Althouse discusses 
reservations about Norman Mailer's book about Gary Gilmore, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG). 
122. "Law that does not dominate life is as difficult to envision as a society in which men do not 
dominate women, and for the same reasons." MACKINNON, TOWARD, supra note 16, at 249. 
123. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See pp. 19·20 supra. 
124. McCleskey v. Zant, _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
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case.125 My clients need a poet-someone disinterested in the law who 
wonders about and represents life-to help them be something other 
than a case, to help them live. My hope for a poet is a wish to slow the 
process of people I care about being overtaken by the law, even as the 
cases lurch forward toward finality, toward winning or losing. 
Lowry treats the law in Karla's story much as she treats Houston; it 
is a place that matters in parts of the story, but only as background. 126 
Lowry understands that the law is about winning and losing, but Crossed 
Over has little to do with that. To Beverly, Karla is never a case. 
The deep passion and agitation that animates the current drive to 
expedite executions 127 is no longer as puzzling to me. Perhaps propo-
nents of speeding up executions understand that a person under a death 
sentence who is truly alive challenges the power of the law that ordered 
her killed. To those proponents, Karla Faye Tucker and the others on 
death row are simply unfinished cases, affronts to the goals of certainty 
and finality, waiting to be sacrificed to principles of justice. Indeed, for 
the New York Times, the story is Karla's case, that she is edging closer to 
becoming the first woman executed by Texas since the Civil War. 
Karla is alive. She is neither waiting nor disappearing. Lowry's 
work confirms Karla's own assessment of her life: "Instead of being at a 
standstill, I'm moving ahead."128 Crossed Over is the story of the. loving 
life that Karla is making on death row with her friends, including at least 
one poet. "Karla is not lonely, does not feel abandoned or set aside; her 
life is exactly where she is: in Mountain View, on Death Row, with the 
other women.,,129 
125. Lawyers appropriate the names of individuals to become the names of legal principles. 
(E.g .• "Miranda" became Miranda, which became "to Miranda" which means to disclose certain 
rights to a criminal suspect.) The names of the individuals on death row are also the names of the 
cases in the state's capital punishment jurisprudence. One of my clients suggested deleting from a 
brief a citation to a California Supreme Court opinion because my client preferred not to be associ-
ated with that man. Lawyers know that the case stands for something other than the man. But at 
some level, my client was right, which I understood even before the court used the case in question 
as authority to reject one of our claims. 
126. Lowry describes the law with accuracy. Her accounts of the lawyers, the courtroom, and 
the evidence ring true. She notices, for example, that the financial resources available for prosecut-
ing Karla were not matched by the funds allotted to her defense. But the law is not prominent in 
Lowry's account. Cf. Althouse, supra note 121, at 1181 (noting that in THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG 
U[t]he law is notable for its distance and its extreme smallness in relation to everything else in the 
story"). 
127. See Gilbert, supra note 103, at 70-80. 
128. LoWRY, supra note 1, at 181. 
129. [d. at 243. 
